I write out and discuss how one might try to prove the continuous time g-computation formula, in the simplest possible case: treatments (labelled a, for actions) and covariates (l: longitudinal data) form together a bivariate counting process.
1 Introduction Robins (1997) outlines a theory of causal inference for complex longitudinal data, when treatments can be administered and covariates observed, continuously in time. This theory is supposed to extend the earlier work of Robins (1986 Robins ( , 1987 Robins ( , 1989 Robins ( , 1997 , devoted to the case in which covariates and treatments take values in discrete spaces, and time advances in discrete time steps. Already in Gill and Robins (2001) , we managed to extend the theory to continuously distributed covariates and treatments. In this note, we address the generalization to continuous time. The major part of this research programme has already been carried out by Lok (2001) . It is an open problem to complete that project with a continuous time version of the g-computation formula and the theorems centered around it. The formula tells one how to write down the probability distribution of an outcome of interest, in the counterfactual situation that a prechosen treatment plan g had been adhered to, rather than the factual case that treatment was assigned haphazardly. Lok (2001) manages to develop a martingale and counting process based theory of Robins' (1997) statistical models, estimators and tests, without having recourse to the g-computation formula. So is it so central to the theory, after all? The answer is that without the formula, the statistical methodology lacks motivation. In particular, one needs the formula in order to show that the test statistics of Lok (2001) really do test the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, in the sense that the counterfactual outcome under all treatment plans g has exactly the same probability distribution.
Below we do not succeed in proving the formula, nor establishing the wishedfor results which should follow from it. What we do do, is present a framework in which these questions can hopefully be studied, and in particular, write down a conjectural g-computation formula and the assumptions under which it is likely to be true.
The model
Suppose that as a patient is followed in time, longitudinal data is gathered and treatment decisions or actions are taken; both continuously in time. The most simple possible of scenarios, is that there is only one kind of action. The only variation in treatment is in the times at which the action is taken, the nature of the actions at different times is irrelevant or always the same; similarly, incoming data takes the form of a sequence of events at random time points, and the only relevant thing is the time of the events, not their nature. Finally we suppose that actions and longitudinal data events are never simultaneous. The pair of point processes therefore forms a bivariate counting process (N a , N l ); or if you prefer, a single marked point process µ with a mark space X = {a, l}, say, and component point processes µ a , µ l ; or if you prefer, two sequences of random positive time points with no ties between them, (0 < T
Ordinary random variables are set in plain lettertype, random processes and random measures in bold. We suppose time varies through a bounded time interval T = [0, τ ] and that the total number of events of both types is finite with probability 1. Recall that a marked point process is a random measure assigning mass 1 to random ordered pairs of a timepoint and accompanying mark, while a counting process counts numbers of events, of each kind, up to each timepoint. We suppose there is no event at time zero. The relations between these quantities are:
is the measure with point mass 1 at the point (t, x) ∈ T × X ; µ x (B) = µ(B × {x}) for each Borel set in T and each mark x = a, l ∈ X ; N
We suppose that we have access to unlimited observational data, and therefore essentially know the probabilility distribution, for a randomly chosen patient, of the just introduced random quantities. The probability law can be recovered from the cumulative intensity process or compensator Λ of the counting process N or, if you prefer, the dual predictable projection or compensator ν of the marked point process µ. Let µ (plain lettertype) denote a possible realization of the random point process µ (bold). Write µ t for the restriction of the measure µ to [0, t] × X . Then for each history of the point process up to the time of an event, thus for each µ t for which there is an event at timepoint t, we have two conditional hazard measures ν x (· | t, µ t ) on (t, τ ], x = a, l, such that the conditional probability that the first event of µ after t is in the time interval ds and has mark equal to x , given the history up to and including time t, is ν x (ds) for s ∈ (t, τ ] and x = a, l. The two conditional hazard measures have no atoms in common, since we assumed there are no simultaneous events. The dual predictable projection of µ is the random measure ν defined by ν(ds, dx) = ν x (ds | t, µ t ) on the event where t is the time of the last event of µ strictly before time s. The cumulative intensity process Λ is defined by Λ x (s) = ν((0, s] × {x}) for all s and x. Thus Λ x (ds) = ν x (ds) = ν x (ds | t, µ t ) where t is as before.
One can generate the whole process by drawing subsequent time points and marks using the two conditional hazard measures, given any history of events up to the jth event at some time point t, to generate the time and mark of the j + 1st event.
Treatment plans
A treatment plan g consists of subplans, one for each j and t
, which prescribes subsequent action timepoints, from time t l j onwards, so long as no further longitudinal data timepoint intervenes. We may therefore further split the subplans into sub-subplans, one for each j and each k, which prescribe the time of the kth action timepoint after the jth longitudinal data timepoint, so long as no new longitudinal data timepoint occurs. The moment there is a new longitudinal data timepoint, the old subplan (or subsubplan), is discarded in favour of the relevant new subplan. Each subplan "assumes" that the overall plan g has been adhered to in previous segments of the history, so each subplan "knows" all the preceding, planned, action timepoints as well as the given preceding longitudinal data timepoints. Thus, if we are adhering to a particular plan g, we can for any sequence of longitudinal data timepoints t l 0 = 0 < t l 1 < t l 2 < . . ., thus for any outcome µ l , write down the complete accompanying sequence of planned action timepoints, and thereby reconstruct a complete outcome of a marked point process µ g given the component marked point process outcome µ l . Moreover this can be done in an adaptive way:
, and of course of the specific treatment plan g under consideration. We can therefore also compute, in an adaptive way, an outcome Λ g = (Λ g,a , Λ g,l ) of the cumulative intensity process Λ, or an outcome ν g = (ν g,a , ν g,l ) of the dual predictable projection ν, through its dependence on µ = µ g , as a function of any sequence of longitudinal data timepoints t l 0 = 0 < t l 1 < t l 2 < . . ., i.e., as a function of µ l .
g-Computation Formula
Suppose a plan g is given. Suppose moreover is given, a random variable Y , taking values in some Polish space, which we consider as the outcome of interest. Alongside the "factual" outcome Y we suppose there is also defined the "counterfactual" outcome Y g : the outcome which would have pertained, had plan g been adhered to. Now the conditional law of Y given µ can be con-sidered as a function of µ, as such we denote it as Law(Y |µ = µ). Therefore, for a given sequence of longitudinal data timepoints t l 0 = 0 < t l 1 < t l 2 < . . ., which determines a possible outcome of µ l , we can evaluate the law of Y given
The g-computation formula, which we want to prove under versions of the usual three assumptions of consistency, no-unmeasured confounding, and evaluability, is the following:
The first thing to note about this formula is that it is a functional of the cumulative intensity function Λ g,l and of the conditional law of Y g given µ, both considered as functionals of µ g , which again is a functional of the chosen treatment plan g and the summation and integration variables in the formula: the total number n of longitudinal data timepoints in the time interval T and their values 0 = t l 0 < t l 1 < . . . < t l n ≤ τ . These variables precisely determine an outcome of µ l . The cumulative intensity function Λ g,l is computed from the conditional probability laws of the 'next longitudinal data timepoint' restricted to the event, that it precedes the next action timepoint, given the history of the process µ up to the times of the zero'th, first, second . . . events. Thus it depends on which version is chosen of each of these conditional probability laws.
Recall from Gill and Robins (2001) that there are two issues in establishing this formula. The first is the question whether, when one chooses appropriate versions of the conditional distributions involved, it gives the right answer. The second question is whether, when conditional distributions are chosen, if possible, in some canonical fashion, the result is uniquely defined as a functional of the joint law of the data µ, Y . We may have to face up to one third, more technical issue: the formula supposes that in the counterfactual world where treatment plan g is followed, there is no explosion in the sequence of timepoints of events; in other words, if we replace the conditional law of Y in the integrand with the constant function 1, the result of the g-computation formula should be the total probability 1. Let us call this condition, the no-explosion condition for plan g.
Now we discuss what the three usual conditions should look like, in this context, and make some remarks on how one might attempt to prove the formula.
The consistency condition, in a sufficient and weaker 'in law' form, should naturally be: Law(Y |µ = µ) = Law(Y g |µ = µ) for outcomes µ consistent with plan g: thus, outcomes µ such that µ a = µ a (µ l , g). The 'no unmeasured confounders' assumption should be that the intensity process of the action events, when the history of the process µ is augmented by taking Y g to be a random variable realized at time t = 0, should be the same as the intensity process of the action events when only the history of µ is taken into account, for outcomes µ consistent with plan g. In terms of conditional distributions, it is the assumption that conditional on the times and types of events up to any number of the events, Y g is independent of the time to the next action event, restricted to the event that it precedes the next longitudinal data event; and we only need to check this condition for outcomes µ consistent with plan g. Just the consistency and the no unmeasured confounders assumptions should be sufficient to establish the correctness of the g-computation formula, when the same conditional distributions are employed in the formula, as are involved in the assumptions. Since typically the probability that µ is consistent with g is zero, this result has no empirical content. Still, given versions of all involved conditional distributions, the result is not obviously true, so does have mathematical content. The first step in the proof is naturally to replace Y with Y g on the right hand side of the formula, using the consistency assumption. How to proceed from here, is not so clear. A strategy which might work, is to consider the right hand side of the g-computation formula, with Y replaced by Y g and τ replaced by a variable timepoint σ ∈ T as a function of σ, say b(σ), and show that it satisfies some integral equation. We are given the value of the function b at σ = τ . If one can show the integral equation is uniquely solved by a constant function b * satisfing b * (0) = Law(Y g ), we are done. The non-explosion condition will presumably be needed in this analysis. The important step is guess a non-trivial probabilistic interpretation of b(σ), and take the guess to define a function b * (σ). Next, use the probabilistic interpretation to write informally a relation between b * (σ + ds) and b * (σ), as an expectation of the possible outcomes in the time interval ds. Use probability theory to convert this to a rigorous relation in integral form.
Informally, the proof should parallel that in the discrete time case and correspond to the remark that the law of Y g given µ σ+dσ does not depend on µ a (dσ). Therefore, in order to recover the law of Y g given µ σ by averaging over the conditional law of the events of µ in the time interval dσ given the events in the past, we need only average over the conditional law of the longitudinal data events. But whether or not there is a longitudinal data timepoint in this small time interval is a Bernoulli (Λ l (dσ)) variable. Thus Law(Y g |µ σ ) is a Bernoulli (Λ l (dσ)) mixture of the two distributions Law(Y g |µ σ+dσ ) with µ l (dσ) = 0, 1. Another possible ingredient is yielded by the remark that the law of Y g given µ t is a martingale in t with respect to the history of µ, and hence can be written as a stochastic integral with respect to µ − ν. The representation involves the intensities of µ with respect to its own history, and with respect to the augmented history when Y g is realized at time 0. In order to obtain a result with empirical content, we have to show how the formula can be uniquely evaluated, under further assumptions, from the joint law of Y and µ. A natural assumption which guarantees a canonical choice of conditional laws is continuity: we should assume that versions of all the conditional laws involved in the g computation formula, can be chosen so as to be continuous on the support of the conditioning variables. The conditioning variables are partial histories of µ up to the so-manyth event, and the total history of µ on T . Continuity of probability laws is in the sense of weak convergence, and the partial and total histories of µ are given their natural topologies. The conditional laws now have canonical versions on the supports of the conditioning variables, and we should make the evaluability condition on the plan g that for partial histories in the support of the corresponding partial history of µ, the next planned action time (restricted to the event where it precedes the next longitudinal data timepoint) lies in the support of the conditional distribution of that time given the partial history so far.
